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Abstract 
This paper presents an empirical analysis of vacancy durations and vacancy 
flows in the Netherlands over the years 1980-1988. We distinguish vacancies 
according to required educational levels. We derive estimates of average 
vacancy durations, and we use these to derive estimates of vacancy flows. We 
find that vacancy durations increase with the required educational level. 
Moreover, vacancy flows tend to be more responsive to the business cycle at 
lower educational levels, while vacancy durations are more responsive at 
higher educational levels. Finally, employers lower the job requirements if 
the vacancy has been open for some time. There is no evidence that they raise 
the job requirements in periods of high unemployment. 
Keywords: Vacancies, vacancy durations, vacancy flows. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper is a contribution to a small literature on vacancies. More 
specifically, we shall study the period of time that an employer needs to 
fill a vacancy, in other words the duration of the vacancy. The vacancy 
duration is a measure of the tightness of the labor market as seen by the 
employer, just as the unemployment duration is a measure of the tightness of 
the labor market as seen by an employee. There are few studies of vacancy 
durations. The only studies we know of are Beaumont (1978) and Roper (1988). 
This paper differs from these studies in a number of ways. Firstly, these 
studies focus on vacancy durations. We also consider vacancy flows. Secondly, 
they study a cross-section of vacancy durations. We shall study the cyclical 
pattern of vacancy durations and vacancy flows. Hence, our study is 
complementary to these studies. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we provide some 
theoretical background. The data are discussed in section 3. The statistical 
model used in this study is introduced in section 4. Section 5 contains the 
empirical results. Finally, in section 6 we draw some conclusions. 
2. Vacancy Durations and Employer Search 
There are numerous empirical studies of unemployment durations. Moreover, 
there is a well-developed theory, job search theory, that can be used, either 
to formulate structural models for the duration of unemployment spells or to 
interpret the results of reduced form models (see Mortensen (1986) for a 
survey of job search theory). According to job search theory the search 
strategy of the unemployed job seeker is characterized by a reservation wage 
(or more generally a reservation value). A job offer with a wage (or value) 
that exceeds the reservation wage (value) is accepted, all other offers are 
turned down. The probability of finding a job in some time interval is equal 
to the product of the probability of obtaining a job offer and the probability 
that a job offer is accepted. 
A number of empirical studies consider the decomposition of the probability 
of finding a job into the probability of obtaining an offer and the acceptance 
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probability (Narendranathan and Nickell (1985), Ridder and Gorter (1986), 
Lancaster and Chesher (1983) and van den Berg (1988)).Although the evidence is 
mixed, many authors conclude that the acceptance probability is almost one, 
i.e. the job seekers accept the first job offer. This is consistent with the 
finding of Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg (1985) that 90% of the employers who 
had vacancies, needed only one offer to fill a vacancy. If unemployed job 
seekers accept the first job offer, then the length of a spell of unemployment 
is determined by the probability of obtaining a job offer in some time 
interval. This implies that interest shifts from the acceptance strategy of 
the job seeker to the acceptance strategy of the employer. The search and 
hiring strategy of the employer determines how long it takes to make an offer 
to a (possibly unemployed) job seeker and who receives this offer. The number 
of unemployed job seekers that find a job in a period is equal to the number 
of job offers made to such job seekers and the total number of job offers is 
equal to the number of job openings filled (we assume that only one offer is 
needed to fill an opening). The number of job openings filled in a period 
gives an upper bound to the possible reduction of unemployment in that period. 
In the sequel we assume that the number of job openings filled in a period 
is equal to the vacancy flow and that the time that an employer needs to fill 
an opening is equal to the vacancy duration. We shall use vacancy and job 
opening interchangeably. Of course, we have to make sure that the vacancy 
data used in the empirical analysis contain all job openings. We may clarify 
these issues by looking more closely at the search behaviour of the 
employers. 
There are several reasons why employers are searching for new employees 
(Holt and David (1966)). First, a new position may be created or the creation 
of a new position may be anticipated. Second, an employee may leave a position 
which remains in existence after he has left. Again, this departure may be 
anticipated or not. At the moment that an unfilled position is anticipated the 
employer may start searching for a new employee. Legal constraints restrict 
the possibility of advance hiring without fuU pay. Moreover, advance hiring 
with full pay is very costly, because the employer has to pay two employees 
until the present employee leaves. The loss associated with an unfilled 
position is only the surplus generated by that position. Hence the search 
period before the position is vacated will not be long. As a consequence there 
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is a large probability that an unfilled position arises. Of course, if the 
unfilled position is not anticipated, the employer can only start searching as 
it arises (given that the position is not eliminated when the present employee 
leaves). 
During the period of search potential employees apply for the position. The 
size of the flow of applicants can be influenced by the firm through 
advertising. Applicants differ in productivity, but the productivity of 
applicants can not be observed. The employer can perform tests to learn about 
this productivity and/or he can use (imperfect) indicators of productivity 
(e.g. education, work experience). If we assume that the wage associated with 
the position is fixed, the employer will only employ employees whose value of 
production exceeds the wage rate. However, because applicants who satisfy this 
requirement, have different productivities there is a return to search. Of 
course, search is not costless. There may be advertising costs, screening 
costs etc. The return to search also depends (positively) on the flow of 
applicants for the position. An applicant will be accepted if the return to 
employing the applicant exceeds the return to further search. This decision 
rule takes the form of a reservation strategy: an applicant qualifies if this 
productivity exceeds an acceptance level. This can be translated into minimal 
acceptable levels of productivity indicators or job requirements. 
The discussion reveals an ambiguity in the definition of a vacancy duration. 
A vacancy duration may start at the moment that the search for a new employee 
begins or it may start at the moment that a position is vacated. We assume 
that the vacancy durations as reported by the employers refer to the period of 
search for an employee. Moreover, we assume that the number of vacancies as 
reported by the employers is equal to the total number of job openings. This 
number is larger than the number of vacated jobs. 
Not much is known about the search strategy used by employers. This study 
concentrates on the outcome of employer search, i.e. the rate at which job 
openings are filled, and we shall not attempt to interpret our results in the 
light of a detailed theory of employer search. In particular, we shall not 
decompose the probability of filling a vacancy into the probability of 
obtaining an applicant and the probability that this applicant is found 
suitable for the job. The only empirical studies of employer search that we 
know of are reported in a series of papers by Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg 
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(1985), Barron and Bishop (1985). 
These authors study the number of applicants, the number of interviews, the 
number of job offers and the number of hours spent on recruitment needed to 
fill a particular vacancy. FoUowing Rees (1966) they distinguish between * 
search at the extensive margin and search at the intensive margin. As a 
measure of search at the intensive margin they use the time spent on 
recruitment (screening etc.) per applicant. Search at the extensive margin is 
measured by the number of applicants seen per interview and the number of 
interviews per employment offer. It is not difficult to see that these 
quantities are estimates of 1/Pj and 1/P0 with Pr the probability that an 
application results in an interview and P 0 the probability that an interview 
leads to a job offer. Note that P/Po is the probability that an application 
results in a job offer and ,if all offers are accepted, this is equal to the 
acceptance probability of the employer. If A^ is the rate at which applicants 
arrive at the firm, then vacancies are filled at a rate 
(2.1) XH = XAPj?0 
Hence, Barron et al.'s finding that the acceptance probability of the 
employers varies inversely with the educational requirements, does not imply 
that vacancies for which a high educational level is required are hard to 
fill. 
The analysis in this paper is at the same time more comprehensive, because 
we take account of differences in the arrival rate and less detailed, because 
we can not distinguish between the arrival rate and the acceptance 
probability. 
We shall discuss our empirical results using a simple theory of vacancy and 
unemployment flows/durations based on the seminal work of Holt (1970). Let U, 
V and S denote the stocks of the unemployed, of vacancies and of employed job 
seekers. Holt does not allow for employed job seekers, which is at variance 
with the observation that most job changes are without intervening 
unemployment. We assume that the number of contacts generated by these stocks 
is 
(2.2) IS^)V 
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with Tm the (average) time between contacts, i.e. 1/Tm is the rate at which 
potential contacts materialize or the 'clock-speed' of the labor market (the 
rate at which vacancies and job seekers meet).The vacancy flow F„ is equal to 
,2.3, F. = <i>£)Vpc 
with Pc the probability that a contact results in a job. As argued, this 
probability is mainly determined by the hiring strategy of the employer. We 
have data on U, V and F„. However, S, P c and Tm are not observed. In steady 
state we have 
(2.4) V = F ^ , U = FUTU, S = F,T, 
Because F„=FS+FU, we find if we assume that T,=TU 
( 2 5) P£ = _ i = J-
xm L v •*• v *- u ¥ i u 
In deriving (2.5) we assume that the average search time of unemployed job 
seekers is equal to the average search time of employed job seekers, i.e. that 
employed job search is as effective as unemployed job search. An implication 
of that assumption is that unemployed job seekers will accept any offer that 
exceeds their unemployment income. As far as we know, there are no empirical 
studies in which the search behaviour of employed and unemployed job seekers 
are compared. 
The left-hand side of (2.5) is the rate at which contacts result in jobs. 
It is a measure of the effectiveness of the labor market corrected for the 
size of that market. Note that in the present formulation we do not need an 
estimate of the average vacancy duration or the vacancy flow. If we make the 
usual assumption that vacancies can only be filled by the unemployed we 
obtain 
(2.6) y— = Tff— 
xm u l v 
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If we have data on vacancy durations we can compare the two indicators. 
3. The Data 
The vacancy duration data analyzed in this study were obtained from the 
Central Statistical Office (C.B.S.) of the Netherlands. They were collected by 
yearly vacancy surveys among employers. The first survey dates back to October 
1980, and all subsequent surveys were conducted in October (1981-1983), 
September (1984) or January (1986-1987). The vacancy survey is a stratified 
random sample of some 20000 employers. The stratification is by size of 
establishment and by industry. Government agencies (central and local), 
educational institutions and temporal employment agencies are excluded from 
the survey. The employers in the surveyed population account for 80-85% of 
total employment. 
With an elusive concept as a vacancy it is important how a vacancy is 
defined in the survey. The employers were asked whether at the time of the 
survey they had vacancies that they wanted to fill either immediately or as 
soon as possible. It was pointed out to the employers that they should also 
consider vacancies for which there are applicants, vacancies for which the 
selection procedure will take so much time that it is impossible to fill it in 
a short time interval and vacancies which they intend to fill with a temporary 
worker. The employers were asked to give a number of characteristics of the 
vacancies: 
-occupation 
-required education (level and kind of training) 
-vacancy duration (interval) 
We only have access to aggregate data, i.e. data on the number of vacancies 
stratified by required education (level and kind of schooling) and duration 
interval. The duration intervals are 0-1, 1-3, 3-6 and 6+ months. In the 
analysis we restrict ourselves to vacancies for which the succesful applicant 
needs a clerical/business training or a technical training. 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the total number of vacancies and the 
number of vacancies that require a clerical/business or a technical training 
over the period October 1980-January 1987. Figure 3.2 contains the 
corresponding numbers of the unemployed. In Figure 3.3 we present the vacancy 
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rates of clerical/business and technical vacancies by educational level. The 
Figures 3.1-3.3 about here. 
number of vacancies decreases until 1983 and rises after that year to a level 
that exceeds that in 1980. The extent of the increase after 1983 differs 
between the required educational levels, the increase for those vacancies that 
require a higher vócational training being much larger than the average 
increase. Over the same period the number of unemployed and the unemployment 
rate first rise and subsequently decrease to a level that is higher than in 
1980. Note that the increase in unemployment for those with a 
business/clerical and a technical training is smaller than the increase in 
total unemployment. 
4. The Statistical Model 
In this paper we analyze grouped duration data. A similar analysis of 
grouped unemployment durations was conducted by Kooreman and Ridder (1983). We 
refer to that paper for technical details. The distribution of an individual 
vacancy duration, which is indexed by i, is fully characterized by its hazard 
rate. We choose a Proportional Hazard model as introduced by Cox (1972), i.e. 
the hazard rate has the following form 
(4.1) Xi(t) = exp(xi'/3Wt)vi 
In (4.1) Xj is a vector of (exogenous) explanatory variables, j3 is a vector of 
regression coefficients, the random variable V; captures the unobserved 
heterogeneity not accounted for in x,- and ip{t) describes the duration 
dependence of the hazard. We shall assume that ^(t) has the Weibull form, i.e. 
(4.2) v(t) = cvt""1 
and that v,- follows a Gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance o . In 
Ridder's (1988) classification this model is a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) 
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model. 
The statistical analysis is complicated by the fact that we do not observe 
the completed durations. All durations are censored at the date of the survey. 
Moreover our sample is not a random sample from the population of (completed) 
durations, but a random sample from the stock of vacancies at a particular 
moment. Because we sample from the stock, we have that vacancies that have 
been open for a longer period are more likely to be included in our sample. In 
the statistical literature this non-random selection is referred to as 
length-biased sampling. Censoring and length-biased sampling bias the duration 
in opposite directions. These biases cancel if the population distribution is 
exponential. The length-biased sampling bias dominates if there is decreasing 
duration dependence, and the truncation bias dominates if the duration 
dependence is increasing. The correct density of length-biased incomplete 
spell (as a function of the density of complete spells) can be found in Ridder 
(1984) and we use his expression. The only assumption made in the derivation 
is that the rate at which vacancies are generated is constant in the period 
preceding the date of the survey. 
The density of an incomplete and length-biased vacancy duration is 
(4.3) h» = _ 9 l ^ > ; / a - d + ^ n - ^ 2 
B( l/a, l/a - l /ee) 
We do not observe the incomplete vacancy duration directly. Instead we only 
know that the duration is in a certain interval. Let p^- be the probability 
that a vacancy of type i has an incomplete duration between t ^ and t^  (t0=0, 
t4=oo).For j=l,...,4 (tj=l, t2=3, t3=6), then 
(4-4) py(fl) = ƒ3 h,(t)dt 
The likelihood function is (there are 4 educational levels x 7 years = 28 
groups of vacancies) 
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(4.5) L(0) =.IJi .17^7/(0) 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters 6 were obtained by minimizing 
the mimis-loglikelihood function using GRMAX (Bekkering and Ridder(1986)). For 
the (numerical) integration in (4.4) we used the NAG-routine D01BAF which is 
based on a Gauss-Legendre quadrature algorithm. 
The vector of regressors x< contains the following variables 
-A set of dummy variables that indicate the year of the survey. 
-The required educational level. We distinguish between lower vocational 
, intermediate vocational, higher vocational and university. 
-The vacancy rate at the time of the survey. 
The use of the vacancy rate as an expianatory variable seems to be 
problematic. In stationary equilibrium the vacancy rate equals the product of 
the inflow rate in the stock of vacancies and the average duration of a 
vacancy. Ho wever, the (possibly time-varying) regressors in a duration model 
need not be strictly exogenous. We only require that they are predetermined. 
To see this it is helpful to think of the process that determines a vacancy 
duration as a sequence of Bernoulli experiments. If the first Bernoulli 
experiment results in a success the vacancy is filled. If it results in a 
failure we proceed to a second (not necessarily identical) experiment which 
again may result in a success (the vacancy is filled in the second time 
period) or a failure (the vacancy duration is longer than the first two 
periods). Now note that the vacancy rate at any time only depends on the 
outcome of previous Bernoulli experiments, i.e. the vacancy rate can be 
considered as predetermined for the present experiment. Hence, we can use the 
vacancy rate as a regressor in the hazard. 
There is a slight complication due to the fact that we do not observe the 
vacancy rate continuously, but only an average rate in a period that includes 
the survey date. However, it can be shown that this does not invalidate the 
argument in the previous paragraph. 
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5. Results 
We have estimated the MPH model separately for the vacancies that require a 
clerical/business orientation and the vacancies that require a technical 
orientation. The maximum likelihood estimates are given in Table 
Table 5.1 about here. 
5.1. The MLE show that a larger vacancy rate is associated with a smaller 
probability that a vacancy is filled. We can interpret this as a congestion 
effect. The year dummies (the reference year is 1980) show that there has been 
a considerable increase in the instantaneous probability that a vacancy is 
filled during the early 80's. There is some evidence of a decrease in the 
second half of this decade. For the clerical/business vacancies we see that a 
higher required level of education means a smaller probability of filling a 
vacancy (the reference level is lower vocational training). Employers take 
(much) more time to find a suitable candidate for a position that requires a 
high educational level. This may be a consequence of the high costs of 
laying-off a highly paid worker. This finding is consistent with the results 
of Barron, Bishop and Dunkelberg who conclude that the acceptance probability 
of an applicant decreases with the level of education. 
In the case of technical vacancies we do not observe such an easily 
interpretable pattern. Employers do not take much time to fill a technical 
vacancy that requires a higher vocational level. Of course, this may be due to 
a relatively large arrival rate of job seekers (employed and unemployed) with 
the required training, which offsets a relatively small acceptance 
probability. 
The estimates also imply that in both cases there is positive duration 
dependence, i.e. the instantaneous probability that a vacancy is filled 
increases with the duration of the vacancy. This suggests that employers 
become less choosy, if a vacancy is open for a long period. Finally note that 
the estimate of o implies that there is a substantial amount of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
We now turn to the implications of our estimates. First we concentrate on 
the clerical/business vacancies. In Figure 5.1 we show the evolution of the 
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average complete vacancy durations by educational level. The order of the 
average durations is as expected. Again we find the by now familiar 'bath tub' 
pattern in the average durations. Note that the higher level vacancy durations 
Figure 5.1 about here. 
are more responsive to labor market conditions. We can decompose the labor 
market effect into a cöngestion effect (the effect of the vacancy rate) and a 
residual effect (the effect of the year dummies, holding the vacancy rate 
constant). This decomposition is illustrated in Figure 5.2. Note that for the 
higher vocational vacancies the increase in the vacancy duration is entirely 
Figure 5.2 about here. 
due to the cöngestion effect. This cöngestion effect is absent for the other 
educational levels. 
Note that in Figure 5.1 the average vacancy duration is almost equal in 1980 
and in 1987. This implies that the observed increase in the number of 
vacancies in the second half of the 80's must be due to an increase in the 
vacancy flow. This is confirmed in Figure 5.3 which also shows that the 
vacancy flows are monotonically increasing over the entire period except in 
Figure 5.3 about here. 
the final year. Note that the vacancy flows at the lower educational levels 
are more responsive to labor market conditions. We conclude that the rise in 
the number of vacancies that is observed after 1983 is a consequence of an 
increase in the number of vacancies that have been generated. Moreover the 
decrease in the number of vacancies that is observed before 1983 is entirely 
due to a decrease in the vacancy durations. 
A similar picture emerges if we study the technical vacancies. From Figure 
5.4 we see that the increase in the average vacancy durations after 1983 has 
been much smaller for the technical vacancies as compared to the 
clerical/business vacancies. If there has been an increase, as in the case of 
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Figure 5.4 about here. 
the higher vocational level, then this increase is entirely due to the 
congestion effect (see Figure 5.5). Again the vacancy flow (see Figure 5.6) 
shows a monotonie increase over the entire period with the lower educational 
Figure 5.5. about here. 
Figure 5.6 about here. 
levels being more responsive to labor market conditions. . The increase is 
spectacular except for the vacancies that require a university degree. Again 
the increase in the number of vacancies is entirely due to the increase in the 
vacancy flow. The decrease in the number of vacancies prior to 1980 is due to 
a decrease in the vacancy duration. 
The agreement between the results for both kinds of vacancies gives an 
intriguing picture of the developments on the labor market during the 
recession of the early 80's and the subsequent recovery. First of all, the 
number of job openings generated by employers has been constant during the 
recession and has increased considerably during the period of recovery. During 
the recession the vacancy durations have been relatively short. This is most 
likely due to an increase in the arrival rate of applicants. The recovery has 
led to an increase of the vacancy durations, in particular at the higher 
educational levels. However, this increase in duration is due to a congestion 
effect which points at a rather inelastic supply at these educational levels. 
The relatively large increase of the vacancy flows at the lower educational 
levels combined with a relatively small increase in the vacancy duration 
f 
points at a rather elastic supply. This is not surprising, because higher 
educational requirements tend to be associated with more specialized jobs. 
To obtain more insight into the functioning of the labor market we must take 
the other side of that market into account, i.e. we should have a closer look 
at the behaviour of the unemployed. For instance, the increase in* the number 
of vacancies may have coincided with an increase in the average duration of 
unemployment or the decrease in unemployment may have coincided with an 
increase in the average vacancy duration. In section 2 we have suggested two 
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comprehensive indicators of the effectiveness of the labor market, i.e. the 
rate at which contacts between job seekers and employers with vacancies occur 
and result in a vacancy being filled (matching rate). Unfortunately, we only 
have data on unemployment durations by educational level as from April 1985. 
Hence, we have to restrict ourselves to average durations for all unemployed 
and all vacancies. 
Figure 5.7 about here. 
The evolution of the two indicators is shown in Figure 5.7. Roth matching 
rates peak in the early 80's, and decline afterwards until 1988. However, in 
both instances the labor market is not as effective in filling job openings in 
1988 as it was in 1980. Figure 5.7 also points at a disturbing inconsistency 
in the data. Until September 1984 the matching rate as computed in (2.5) is 
larger than that computed according to (2.6). It is easily seen that this 
implies that Fu>Fv, i.e. the number of unemployed that find a job is larger 
than the number of job openings that are filled. This is clearly contrary to 
our expectations. There are several explanations for this phenomenon, but they 
are all tentative. First, Fy may be an overestimate of the number of 
unemployed who find a job in a particular month. This may be due to 
registration problems (if unemployed individuals fail to renew their 
registration they are assumed to have found a job, and consequently they are 
in Fy), or to the fact that the unemployed may withdraw from the labor market 
(and hence do not find a job, but are in Fv). Secondly, F^ may be an 
underestimate of the number of job openings that are filled in a month, 
because some employers may fill jobs without announcing (in the survey) a job 
opening. Irrespective of the explanation, it should be stressed that there are 
major inconsistencies in the data on labor market flows. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have studied vacancy durations and vacancy flows for two 
types of vacancies which account for 60% of all vacancies . We have 
concentrated on the effect of educational requirements and the cyclical 
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variation of vacancy durations and vacancy flows. It turns out that the 
cyclical pattern in flows and durations differs between educational levels, 
but that this pattern is quite similar between the two types of vacancies. At 
lower educational levels the vacancy flow is more sensitive to labor market 
conditions, while for jobs that require a higher educational level we observe 
a greater sensitivity of the average vacancy duration. We have interpreted 
these differences by referring to the association between the degree of 
specialization and the educational level. The difficulties that employers 
encounter in filling a vacancy increase with the level of the education 
required. A rather surprising conclusion is that the number of vacancies 
generated by employers has not decreased during the recession in the early 
80's. All this points to a dominant role of the supply of applicants in 
explaining the cyclical pattern of vacancy durations and vacancy flows. There 
is no evidence that employers change their hiring standards over the cycle. 
Hovvever, there is evidence that they lower their hiring standards if they can 
not fill a vacancy. 
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Table 5.1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates (Standard Errors) MPH Model for 
Vacancy Durations. 
Qerical/Business Vacancies Technical Vacancies 
CONSTANT .36 (.006) -.78 (.060) 
VACANCY RATE -.24 (.030) -.37 (.020) 
1980 - -
1981 1.23 (.084) .45 (.036) 
1982 1.32 (.093) 1.34 (.059) 
1983 1.48 (.089) 1.88 (.069) 
1984 1.08 (.075) 1.66 (.058) 
1986 1.15 (.084) 1.67 (.057) 
1987 .74 (.074) 1.55 (.054) 
LOWER VOC - -
INTERMED VOC -1.10 (.010) -.33 (.022) 
HIGHER VOC -2.32 (.120) .22 (.028) 
UNIVERSITY -2.86 (.140) -.89 (.044) 
2 
O 1.11 (.059) .58 (.027) 
cv 2.32 (.107) 1.28 (.042) 
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Figure 3.1. Number of vacancies, total, technical and clerical/business; 
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Figure 3.2 Unemployment, total, technical and clerical/business workers 
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Fi gure 3.3 Vacancy — rates by educationai level {o/o) 
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Figure 5.1. Average complete durations of clericall business vacancies 
by educational level (months) 
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Figure 5.2 Decomposition of the average complete durations of clericall 
business vacancies at higher educational level 
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Figure 5.3 Flows of clericaljbusiness vacancies by educational level 
(numbers/month) 
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Figure 5.4 Average complete durations of technical vacancies 
by educational level {months) 
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Figure 5.5 Decomponsition of the average complete duration of technical 
vacancies at higher educational level 
3.5 
3 
2.5 
2 
1.5 
1 
.5 
O 
1983 
° Total effect 
1984 1985 1987 
° Residual effect 
Figure 5.6 Flows of technical vacancies by educational level 
(numbers jmonth) 
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Figure 5.7 Indicators of labour market efficiency 
(indicator 1: see (2.5), indicator 2: see (2.6)) 
—i 1 1 r 
1981 1982 1983 198' 
— i 1 1 r 
1985 1986 1987 1981 1989 
° Indicator 1 
25 
1988-1 H. Visser 
1988-2 A.H.Q.M. Merkies 
T. van der Meer 
1988-3 H.J. Bierens 
J. Hartog 
1988-4 N.M. van Dijk 
1988-5 N.M. van Dijk 
M. Rumsewicz 
1988-6 H. Linneman 
C.P. van Beers 
1988-7 N.M. van Dijk 
1988-8 J.C.W. van Ommeren 
1988-9 H.C. Tijms 
1988-10 J.P. de Groot 
H. Clemens 
1988-11 H. Verbruggen 
J. Wuijts 
1988-12 H.C. Tijms 
J.C.W. van Ommeren 
1988-13 N.M. van Dijk 
E. Smeitink 
1988-14 J. Rouwendal 
1988-15 H. Verbruggen 
1988-16 Mevr. H. Weijland 
Mevr. R. Herweijer 
J. de Groot 
1988-17 N.M. van Dijk 
1988-18 A.H.Q.M. Merkies 
I.J. Steyn 
1988-19 J. Rouwendal 
1988-20 J.C.W. van Ommeren 
R.D. Nobel 
Austrian thinking on international economics 
Theoretical foundations for the 3-C model 
Nonlinear regression with discrete explanato-
ry variables, with an application to the 
earnings function 
On Jackson's product form with *jump-over' 
blocking 
Networks of queues with service anticipating 
routing 
Commodity Composition of Trade in Manufactu-
res and South-South Trade Potential 
A LCFS finite buffer model with batch input 
and non-exponential sevices 
Simple approximations for the batch-arrival 
Mx/G/1 queue 
Algorithms and approximations for bath-arri-
val queues 
Export Agriculture and Labour Market in 
Nicaragua 
Patterns of South-South trade in manufactures 
Asymptotic analysis for buffer behaviour in 
communication systems 
A non-exponential queueing systera with batch 
servicing 
Existence and uniqueness of stochastic price 
equilibria in heterogeneous markets 
GSTP, the structure of protection and South-
South trade in manufactures 
Female participation in agriculture in the 
Dominican Republic 
Product Forms for Random Access Schemes 
Adaptive Forecasting with Hyperfilters 
Specification and Estimation of a Logit Model 
for Housing Choice in the Netherlands 
An elementary proof of a basic result for the 
GI/G/1 queue 
26 
